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Abstract
Dynamic testing or fuzzing of embedded firmware is severely limited
by hardware-dependence and poor scalability, partly contributing
to the widespread vulnerable IoT devices. We propose a software
framework that continuously executes a given firmware binary
while channeling inputs from an off-the-shelf fuzzer, enabling
hardware-independent and scalable firmware testing. Our framework,
using a novel technique called P2IM, abstracts diverse peripherals
and handles firmware I/O on the fly based on automatically generated
models. P2IM is oblivious to peripheral designs and generic to
firmware implementations, and therefore, applicable to a wide range
of embedded devices. We evaluated our framework using 70 sample
firmware and 10 firmware from real devices, including a drone, a
robot, and a PLC. It successfully executed 79% of the sample firmware
without any manual assistance. We also performed a limited fuzzing
test on the real firmware, which unveiled 7 unique unknown bugs.
1 Introduction
Microcontrollers, or MCU, are commonly used for building
IoT (Internet of Things) and modern embedded devices,
thanks to their high energy-efficiency, extensible connectivity,
and adequate computing power. As MCU devices become
widely deployed in various scenarios, ranging from smart
homes to industrial systems, their security has been raised as
a major concern among users and operators. As demonstrated
in recent reports [47], software vulnerabilities cause the
majority of attacks on MCU devices, resulting in not only
digital but also physical damages.
MCU firmware (i.e., the whole software stack on MCU)
contains vulnerabilities just as computer software does. Most
MCU vulnerabilities are virtually the same in nature as their
computer counterparts. Therefore, it would be ideal if the
proven vulnerability discovering techniques on computers,
such as fuzz-testing or fuzzing, can be applied to MCU
firmware. However, in reality, off-the-shelf fuzzers cannot
directly test firmware, which partly contributed to the fact
that many firmware is not sufficiently tested for security
vulnerabilities [28].
The inapplicability of fuzzers on MCU boils down to the
lack of a platform where firmware can execute while taking
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Figure 1: Framework Overview
inputs from fuzzers. Existing emulators cannot help because
none of them emulates the whole range of MCU peripherals
(i.e., unable to run firmware). Some recent works addressed
this issue using hybrid emulation [34, 43, 51, 54], which
forwards peripheral operations to real devices. Although this
approach creates a platform to run firmware with a fuzzer,
the platform is fairly slow and can hardly scale due to the
hardware dependence.
We present a novel approach to firmware fuzzing. We
design a framework to run and test MCU firmware at
scale without any hardware dependence. Our framework
takes a firmware binary as input and hosts an unmodified
fuzzer (AFL [55]) as a drop-in component. Using a generic
processor emulator (QEMU), the framework executes the
firmware and handles its peripheral accesses while channeling
the fuzzing input and feedback between the firmware and the
fuzzer. Figure 1 shows an overview of the framework.
The key technique used in our framework is called P2IM
(or Processor-Peripheral Interface Modeling). It automatically
models the I/O behaviors of a wide range of peripherals
while treating peripherals themselves as black boxes. The
generated models satisfy a property we formulated, called
Processor-Peripheral Interface Equivalence. We show that
when this property is satisfied, an emulated execution
of firmware can continue smoothly (e.g., no crash, stall
or skipped peripheral operations) without requiring any
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dependent peripherals (either real or emulated).
We evaluated our framework using 70 sample firmware
and 10 firmware from real MCU-based devices, including a
drone, a robot, and a PLC (Programmable Logic Controller).
The result shows that our framework can continuously run
79% of the sample firmware without any crash, stall or
skipped peripheral operations. We also performed basic
fuzzing (without memory sanitizer) on the real firmware and
discovered 7 unique and previously unknown bugs.
2 Roadmap & Overview
2.1 MCU Firmware & Testing
Firmware generally means any low-level software that
controls hardware in a computing device. In this paper,
we focus on firmware for microcontrollers (MCU). These
devices are cost- and power-effective computers built
for specific purposes, such as the motion controller of a
self-balancing robot, the engine control units (ECU) in a car,
etc. STM32L010F4 [24] is an example of ultra-low-power
MCUs commonly used in IoT devices. It carries an ARM
Cortex-M0+ processor at 32MHz, 16KB flash as the persistent
storage, 2KB of RAM, and a wide range of peripherals.
MCU firmware is usually a monolithic piece of software
that contains peripheral device drivers, a tiny OS or system
library, and a set of specialized logics or applications. For
example, the firmware in a MCU-based drone contains the
drivers for all onboard peripherals, either a small real-time
operating system or vendor-customized system library, and
the PID (proportional, integral and derivative) controller
among other application-level logics. We note that MCU
vendors rarely use general-purpose OS such as Linux to build
MCU firmware. Due to hardware constraints, they prefer
an OS specifically designed for MCU or simply use a thin
system library in lieu of a stand-alone OS (called bare-metal
devices). In the rest of the paper, we refer to MCU firmware
simply as firmware for brevity.
Due to the fast development and wide adoption of MCU
devices in cyber-physical and IoT systems, the security issues
of these devices, often caused by vulnerable firmware [47],
have led to severe consequences and become a major concern
among users and operators [27]. To mitigate vulnerable MCU
devices, researchers recently proposed techniques for fuzz-
testing firmware [34, 43, 54]. These techniques allow partial
execution of firmware on an emulator while forwarding
unsupported operations (e.g., peripheral I/O) to real hardware.
This line of work allowed fuzzing to be applied to firmware.
But due to the hardware dependence and slow forwarding,
fuzzing through these partial emulators can hardly scale up.
For instance, the number of parallel fuzzing runs is limited
by the availability and capacity of the dependent hardware;
the speed of each fuzzing run is severely capped by the I/O
forwarding, which is three orders of magnitude slower than na-
tive I/O [43]. As a result, high scalability, the key requirement
for effective software fuzzing, cannot be achieved when using
partial emulation that depends on slow and limited hardware.
2.2 Open Challenges
If the state-of-the-art fuzzers could work directly on firmware
at scale, the significant values of these fuzzers demonstrated
on computer software (e.g., unparalleled vulnerability
discovery ability) can automatically transfer to MCU
firmware, which can tremendously help reduce vulnerabilities
and improve security of MCU devices. However, despite the
previous efforts aiming at this goal [34, 43, 51, 54], we still
identified the following open challenges that prevent fuzzers
for computer software from being effective on firmware.
Hardware Dependence: Previous efforts on firmware
fuzzing require certain hardware (e.g., peripherals). This is
due to incomplete hardware emulation. Moreover, such de-
pendent hardware is much slower than emulators running on
computers. As a result, the hardware dependence introduces
orders of magnitudes of delays to fuzzer execution. Moreover,
hardware dependence also critically limits parallelism. For
instance, one dependent peripheral can only be used by one
fuzzing session. Therefore, highly parallel fuzzing, which
is the key to fuzzers’ success on computer software, is not
achievable.
Wide Range of Peripherals: Due to the poor performance
and scalability caused by hardware dependence, some recent
work proposed purely emulation-based fuzzing of firmware.
In fact, fuzzing software on a fully emulated platform has been
found useful for a long time in cases where software under test
cannot be instrumented or is only available in binary forms.
However, creating fully emulated MCU has proven impracti-
cal and no existing emulators offer generic MCU support. This
is mainly because of the highly heterogeneous MCU hard-
ware in general and the wide range of peripherals in particular.
Each firmware may interact with a distinct set of peripherals,
which can be customized by the MCU vendor. Peripherals
of the same type but different models/brands often have dif-
ferent specifications and interfaces. Therefore, a specially
customized emulator is often required for fuzzing or testing
a new firmware. Building such emulators remains a manual
task, which is not only error-prone but impossible to catch up
with the large and fast-increasing number of MCU devices.
Diverse OS/System Designs: In addition to the hardware-
related challenges unique to MCU, the software also
poses challenges to firmware fuzzing that are currently
unaddressed. Unlike general-purpose computers, whose
OSes are dominated by a few mainstream options that follow
similar designs, MCU devices use a much larger and more
diverse set of OSes that are significantly different from each
other. Many MCU devices do not even have a typical OS but
a system library that manages hardware and task scheduling.
The diverse OS/system designs among MCU means that
OS-specific fuzzing methods, which existing system fuzzers
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use (e.g., syscall fuzzers), are not applicable to firmware. In
other words, generic firmware fuzzing should be OS-agnostic
and not make assumptions about the OS/system designs.
Incompatible Fuzzing Interfaces: Another software-related
challenge unique to firmware fuzzing is about the interfaces
through which fuzzer-generated inputs are channeled into
firmware execution. For computer software fuzzing, the
input interfaces are well-defined and uniform (e.g., via files
or standard I/O). However, firmware reads all inputs via
peripherals, which come in many different types and have
their own access conventions. Making the matter more
complicated, different drivers in firmware may configure
the same peripheral differently and then perform I/O
through different interfaces. As a result, the input interfaces
supported by existing fuzzers are incompatible with firmware.
Moreover, manually adding support for every peripheral I/O
interface to fuzzers can be a daunting task, if possible at all.
We note that the aforementioned challenges are unique to
MCU firmware fuzzing. There are other open problems
facing software fuzzing in general, such as better input
generation, more effective error detection, etc. However,
this work is focused on tackling the challenges unique to
firmware fuzzing. We consider improving general fuzzing
techniques orthogonal and out-of-scope for this paper.
2.3 Our Approach
We present a novel approach to MCU firmware fuzzing,
which overcomes the challenges discussed before. We design
a framework that supports fuzzers as drop-in components to
test firmware in a scalable and hardware-independent fashion.
The framework aims to solve the MCU-imposed fuzzing
challenges while allowing fuzzers to focus on performing and
improving their own job (i.e., generating inputs and finding
bugs). The goal of our framework is to bridge the wide
open gap between fuzzers and firmware. It allows existing
fuzzers to test firmware without any knowledge about the
software and hardware design of MCU. It also facilitates the
development of specialized fuzzers for firmware.
Our approach is novel in that it neither relies on any hard-
ware nor emulates peripherals. We introduce a form of approx-
imate MCU emulation for supporting firmware testing and
fuzzing. More importantly, we provide a method to automati-
cally generate approximate emulators based on firmware bina-
ries. The approach is inspired by our observation that firmware
can execute on an emulator without real or fully emulated pe-
ripherals, as long as the emulator provides the firmware with
acceptable inputs from peripherals when needed. Such inputs
do not have to be the same as what a real peripheral would
produce. But they do need to pass firmware’s internal checks
to avoid disrupting firmware execution. For a given firmware,
our approximate emulator uses a generic processor/ISA em-
ulator (e.g., one for ARM Cortex-M) and a model, automat-
ically built for the firmware, that captures what constitutes an
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Figure 2: Architecture diagram of MCU devices. Firmware
running on processor core interacts with peripherals via 1©
memory-mapped registers, 2© interrupts, and 3© DMA.
acceptable input for each peripheral accessed by the firmware.
We find that this kind of approximate emulation can compre-
hensively exercise a firmware (i.e., covering most firmware
code), and therefore, is sufficient for supporting fuzzing and
other types of firmware analyses that examine the control or
data behaviors of firmware (as opposed to testing functional
correctness), such as taint analysis, invariant detection, etc.
Next, we provide the necessary background on peripheral
interfaces. We then define a property that an approximate
MCU emulation must meet in order to be acceptable for sup-
porting firmware fuzzing. At the end of the section, we discuss
the high-level design of our framework that enables the ap-
proximate firmware execution and supports firmware fuzzing.
2.4 Processor-Peripheral Interfaces
Peripherals are indispensable from MCU devices and of
great varieties. As shown in Figure 2, they can be on-chip
or off-chip. On-chip peripherals typically serve as the proxy
through which data travels between firmware and off-chip
peripherals. Some on-chip peripherals are not externally
connected and provide simple functionalities needed by
firmware (e.g., timers). In this paper, we only consider on-
chip peripherals (or peripherals for short) because firmware
cannot access off-chip peripherals directly. As illustrated in
Figure 2, there are three types of peripheral I/O interfaces
exposed to firmware, namely memory-mapped registers,
interrupts, and direct memory access (DMA). Firmware
performs all I/O through these interfaces. We refer to the first
two types ( 1© and 2© in Figure 2) as processor-peripheral
interfaces as they connect processors and peripherals.
We note that this work covers the processor-peripheral
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interfaces and not DMA. We leave DMA out of scope for this
paper because it is extremely difficult to model automatically
and its I/O behavior is heavily dependent on internal designs
of individual peripherals, which our method is oblivious of
to be generic. Nonetheless, DMA is not frequently used by
MCU peripherals, which tend to exchange small amounts of
data with firmware (only 2 out of 70 firmware tested in §5.1
use DMA).
We define a new property, related to peripheral I/O mod-
eling, for MCU emulators. It is called Processor-Peripheral
Interface Equivalence (or P2IE). Satisfying this property
means that: (1) the emulator emulates the processor-
peripheral interfaces, rather than peripherals themselves used
by the firmware, and (2) the emulated interfaces are equivalent
to those of the peripherals expected by the firmware, in terms
of their impact to firmware execution. The formulation of
P2IE is based on our experience with firmware analysis for a
wide range of MCUs. We observed that providing equivalent
processor-peripheral interfaces is sufficient for a generic em-
ulator, without any peripheral emulation, to comprehensively
execute and test/fuzz firmware. A P2IE-enabled emulator
handles peripheral I/O operations by providing the processor-
peripheral interfaces and mimicking their external behaviors.
We also define an empirical test for P2IE: the property is sat-
isfied if the firmware running on the peripheral-agnostic emu-
lator never crashes, stalls, or skips operations due to peripheral
I/O errors. A crash may happen when the firmware tries to
read/write data from/to a peripheral but encounters a fatal er-
ror, such as illegal memory access or unsupported peripheral
operations. A stall may occur when the firmware waits for a
peripheral state to change but the emulator fails to recognize
and handle it. Under a similar situation, the firmware may
eventually give up on waiting and skip operations, causing
parts of firmware code to be unreachable. For instance, before
reading data from a peripheral such as ADC (analog-to-digital
converter), firmware needs to wait for a memory-mapped reg-
ister bit to be set, which indicates data is ready. If the emulator
fails to set such bits, firmware stalls without showing any signs
of errors. Alternatively, after a long wait, the firmware simply
skips the operations (not only the input operation but also
subsequent operations depending on the input).
We use the definition of P2IE to guide our framework
design. We use the empirical test of P2IE as a way to verify if
our framework generates emulators that satisfy this property.
By focusing on the interface equivalence (i.e., gen-
eralizable), rather than emulating every peripheral (i.e.,
non-generalizable), we demonstrate that it is possible to
automatically build approximate emulators for MCU devices
equipped with a wide range of peripherals. This automated
generation of MCU emulators is the key to hardware-
independent, scalable, and high-coverage firmware testing.
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2.5 Framework Overview
The framework, for the first time, allows firmware to be
dynamically tested and fuzzed without using any MCU
devices, hardware peripherals, or human assistance.
The model derivation process, called Processor-Peripheral
Interface Modeling (or P2IM), contains two steps, as shown
in Figure 3. First, an abstract model is defined for a broad
class of MCU architectures (e.g., ARM Cortex-M). An
abstract model captures the generic patterns and conventions
that firmware follows and acceptable input when accessing
processor-peripheral interfaces. Such information is readily
available in MCU device datasheets or processor documenta-
tion. An abstract model also contains a customizable interrupt
firing strategy suitable for the entire MCU architecture
class. Defining an abstract model is a manual and offline
process done by domain experts. It is practical because it only
happens once for each class of MCU architectures (only a few
architecture classes are common among MCU) and, using our
template, defining an abstract model for a new architecture
class does not require too much effort. Abstract models do not
vary much across different architecture classes. We discuss
the definition of the abstract model for ARM Cortex-M,
serving as a template for other MCU architectures, in §3.
The second step is model instantiation, which is fully au-
tomatic and needed for every firmware to be tested. It instan-
tiates the abstract model defined for the MCU architecture of
a given firmware. It concretizes the abstract model with the
firmware-specific information, such as where specifically each
peripheral register is mapped in memory and what interdepen-
dency among the registers, if broken, may impact firmware
execution. This firmware-specific (or device-specific) infor-
mation is necessary due to the high heterogeneity of MCU
(e.g., devices using the same architecture often have different
peripheral and interface specifications). Without this infor-
mation, emulators cannot provide the processor-peripheral
interfaces equivalent to the real ones (i.e., achieving P2IE).
Our framework automatically infers the firmware-specific
information using a technique called explorative firmware
executions. An instantiated model tells the emulator what con-
stitutes access to peripheral interfaces and how such access
should be handled based on its type and the runtime condition.
We discuss the details about model instantiation in §4.
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Besides P2IM, another important part of our framework
design is the support of fuzzers as drop-in components and
the feeding of fuzzing inputs to the firmware execution. Our
framework does not have special requirements for fuzzers,
which are simply treated as black-box input generators. The
framework channels the fuzzing input into the peripheral
interface access handlers in the emulator, which feed the
fuzzing input when the firmware expects raw input data (as
opposed metadata or status input) from peripherals. Our
framework also provides standard coverage feedback to
fuzzers, collected through the emulator. We discuss the fuzzer
setup and the fuzzing results on real firmware in §5.4
3 Abstract Model Definition
As illustrated in Figure 3, the first step of modeling the
processor-peripheral interfaces is to build an abstract
model for a target MCU architecture class. This is the only
manual step in P2IM and should be fairly straightforward for
embedded system engineers or security researchers with basic
knowledge about MCU firmware and hardware. An abstract
model captures the generic patterns and conventions that
firmware follows when accessing the processor-peripheral
interfaces. For instance, firmware for MCU devices based on
ARM Cortex-M typically access different types of peripheral
registers via memory-mapped I/O (i.e., peripheral registers
are mapped to a fixed region in memory for firmware to read-
/write). Firmware for these devices also enables a range of
peripheral interrupts mainly for performing asynchronous I/O.
We define an abstract model for ARM Cortex-M, the most
popular architecture class for IoT devices, which can be used
as a template for building abstract models for other MCU
architectures (see §6 for more details). The model generalizes
peripheral registers into four types and provides the access
patterns and handling strategy for each type (i.e., how an em-
ulator should identify each type of registers and handle each
access to a peripheral register based on its type). This access
pattern-based register type identification and type-based regis-
ter access handling is generically applicable to all peripherals
on Cortex-M. Therefore, emulators can perform them without
requiring any knowledge about specific peripherals (e.g., what
kind of peripheral does a register belong to) or knowledge
about peripheral internal designs. The model abstracts
peripheral interrupt firing as a special input channel and
allows customizable interrupt firing strategies. Also included
in the abstract model are the locations of the basic memory
segments, such as the RAM, the flash, the mapped register
region, which remain the same for devices using the same
MCU architecture and are specified in MCU documentations1.
On ARM Cortex-M MCUs, peripheral registers are mapped
to 0x40000000–0x5fffffff memory segment as required
by the architecture design [1] [44] (i.e., this is an architectural
1The flash region, where firmware is loaded, may vary on some devices.
This information is available in device datasheet.
requirement that all hardware and software using this
architecture need to follow). P2IM considers each memory
word in this segment a potential memory-mapped register.
3.1 Register Category, Access Patterns and
Handling
Control Registers: Control registers of peripherals, or
CR, are used mostly by firmware to control or configure
peripherals. For example, firmware sets the corresponding
bits in USART’s CR to enable the transmitter or interrupts
or to set the baud rate.
CR Access pattern: We observed a read-modify-write
(RMW) pattern unique to CR, whereby firmware first reads
a CR, then modifies the configuration parameters in it, and
finally writes the value back to the register. Firmware follows
the RMW pattern when accessing CR because firmware
can only write at word/register granularity and the RMW
pattern avoids inadvertently changing other parameters
co-exist in the same register. P2IM uses the RMW pattern
to identify CR. In some rare case (e.g., a CR contains only
one configuration parameter), firmware may write directly
to it without following the RMW pattern. In this case P2IM,
due to the write-on-first-access pattern of DR defined below,
P2IM can mis-categorize such a CR into DR. However, in most
cases, this mis-categorized register is never read afterward
(i.e., for one-time peripheral configuration). Therefore, this
kind of register mis-categorization does not impact firmware
execution or needs correction.
CR Access handling: Once a peripheral is configured
by the firmware, the peripheral operates accordingly and
rarely changes value of CR (i.e., peripheral configuration).
Therefore, P2IM models each CR as a non-volatile memory
word. When firmware reads a CR, the emulator returns the
value previously written to the CR. If a CR is read without
being explicitly written before, which can happen after a
hardware reset, the emulator simply returns zero, which is
the default value for CR in most cases.
Status Registers: A status register, or SR, is a set of flags
(i.e., each flag may contain 1 or more bits) that indicate the
internal states of a peripheral. During runtime, peripherals
update their SR as their status change (peripherals can also
use interrupts to notify firmware of status changes, which is
discussed in §3.2). Before performing certain peripheral I/O
operations, firmware polls the corresponding SR bits to make
sure the peripheral is ready. For example, firmware reads data
from USART only when the data-reception flag in a SR is set,
indicating some data has been received. Otherwise, firmware
simply waits. In many cases, if the necessary SR flags are
not set, firmware ceases to boot or stalls infinitely (e.g., the
system-clock-ready flag in a clock manager peripheral). On
the other hand, setting the wrong SR bits can cause firmware
to crash. For example, certain SR bits being set means fatal
peripheral errors, which can switch firmware into recovery
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or debug mode that requires external intervention. Therefore,
properly handling firmware access to SR is critical for achiev-
ing P2IE and undisrupted execution and testing of firmware.
SRAccess pattern: These registers are used by firmware to
check peripheral states. P2IM categorizes a newly discovered
register as SR if the first access to the register is an uncondi-
tional read and the read value is later evaluated in a condition.
For some SR, the first access on them can be a write, for exam-
ple, when firmware acknowledging a peripheral error. In this
case, P2IM could initially mis-categorize the SR into DR due to
the second DR access pattern defined below. However, P2IM
automatically corrects such mistakes later by leveraging our
observation that firmware often reads SR continuously (i.e.,
to poll peripheral state under synchronous I/O) but not other
types of registers. Therefore, when firmware continuously
polls on a previously categorized DR, P2IM adjusts its cate-
gory to SR and locks its type. We call it polling pattern of SR.
SR Access handling: Since P2IM does not model periph-
erals themselves and is oblivious to their internal designs, its
handling of SR is not based on knowing the semantics of the
flags or the registers. Instead, the SR handling aims to dynami-
cally infer an acceptable register value at each SR read so that
firmware can continue executing (i.e., the value can pass the
firmware’s internal checks and lead to subsequent peripheral
I/O operations guarded by this SR). P2IM uses a technique
called explorative execution to automatically infer acceptable
SR values during runtime. This technique belongs to the
firmware-specific part of P2IM (i.e., the model instantiation
part), which is discussed in §4. On the other hand, handling
SR write is much simpler and the same for all firmware. P2IM
treats SR writes as no-ops, which are ignored by the emulator.
This is because SR are volatile and values written by firmware
only matter to peripherals internally and are not read back by
firmware. In other words, SR write is one-way and the value
is transient and does not affect firmware execution. P2IE can
be achieved without handling SR writes.
Data Registers: Data registers, or DR, are the main channel
through which raw data flows from peripherals to firmware.
Oftentimes, data read by firmware through DR originates
from off-chip peripherals (e.g., Zigbee radio) or a remotely
connected device (e.g., a supervisory computer in SCADA
system). For example, SPI peripheral holds the data it
received from an off-chip peripheral (e.g., Zigbee radio) in its
DR, which is then read by firmware as input. Data also flows
in the opposite direction. Firmware writes output data in the
DR and then SPI sends it to an off-chip peripheral.
DR Access pattern: Firmware only reads a DR (i.e., taking
raw input from a peripheral) after confirming that the pe-
ripheral is in a ready state by checking the corresponding SR.
Based on this unique access pattern of DR, P2IM categorizes
a newly discovered register as DR if reading the register is
preceded by an SR read and conditional on a flag in the SR.
Sometimes firmware writes to DR directly without checking
any SR. P2IM uses this write-on-first-access as another access
pattern for identifying DR.
DR Access handling: DR of all peripherals collectively
dominate the inputs to firmware, and therefore, they are ideal
fuzzing interfaces. Our framework uses modeled DR to feed
fuzzing and testing inputs during runtime. These inputs are
generated by a drop-in fuzzer, which may or may not be aware
of firmware/peripheral specifics (our current prototype uses
unmodified AFL). Upon each DR read, the emulator returns
the next word from the fuzzing input as the register value.
For other types of dynamic analysis, the input source can be
replaced with, for example, previously recorded inputs (for
bug/execution reproduction) or specially crafted inputs (for
taint analysis). Similar to SR writes, P2IM ignores DR writes
for the same reason that they do not affect firmware execution.
Control-Status Register: A control-status register, or C&SR,
is a hybrid register whose bits are split between two purposes:
control/configuration bits (same to CR) and status bits (same
to SR). Although hybrid registers allow for higher utilization
of register bits, they greatly complicate both peripheral hard-
ware and firmware designs. Therefore, they are not commonly
used in modern MCU devices, which have abundant memory
address space for mapping peripheral registers. In practice, we
only observed some rare use of C&SR. We have not seen other
types of hybrid registers, such as control-data or status-data
registers, which are theoretically possible but impractical.
C&SR Access pattern: CR bits of C&SR are modified in the
RMW pattern during the peripheral configuration phase. SR
bits of C&SR are accessed during the peripheral operation
phase. The configuration phase proceeds the operation phase.
They do not overlap. As a result, P2IM often categorizes
C&SR as CR in the first place. However, such inaccurately
categorized registers are corrected later when P2IM observes
the SR access pattern on them.
C&SR Access handling: For each C&SR access, firmware
operates on either the CR bits or the SR bits, but not both
because they are used at different stages during firmware
execution. Since handling SR bit access requires firmware-
specific information (similar to handling SR register access),
C&SR handling is not covered by the abstract model but by
the instantiated model, which is discussed in §4.
Remarks: Although the register access patterns and the type
identification method are purely empirical, we find that in
practice they work fairly reliably and accurately across a wide
range of peripheral devices (see §5 for the evaluation results).
We attribute this practical and promising results to two factors:
(1) the register types we defined are generically applicable
to all peripherals; (2) the type-based access patterns were
observed and generalized from a variety of real MCU
devices; (3) trade-offs are carefully made when designing
the type-based access patterns. Specifically, we observed the
write-on-first-access pattern not only on DR, but also on CR
and SR in some occasions. We still use this pattern to identify
DR despite that certain CR and SR might be mis-categorized.
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This trade-off is made and justified by the following
considerations. First, this pattern is most commonly seen on
DR. By using this pattern for detecting DR, we can achieve
the best overall register categorization accuracy. Second, a SR
mis-categorized by this pattern is often corrected later on by
the polling pattern unique to SR (i.e., this mis-categorization is
temporary). Third, a CR mis-categorized by this pattern (e.g.,
a CR contains only one configuration parameter) does not im-
pact firmware execution/testing or needs correction because
firmware generally does not read or take input from CR.
3.2 Interrupt Firing
Apart from the register categories and handling, the abstract
model also defines how emulators should fire necessary
interrupts on behalf of peripherals in order to satisfy P2IE
and support continuous firmware execution or testing.
In essence, interrupts are a special type of inputs to
firmware. They notify firmware of certain hardware events
and trigger the corresponding interrupt service routines (ISR),
which are interrupt handlers implemented by peripheral
drivers in firmware. For instance, an interrupt may signal
the firmware that input data is ready. Then the corresponding
ISR is invoked and reads the input data from a DR.
A processor emulator, such as QEMU, often includes
a virtual interrupt controller, which could dispatch fired
interrupts to software. However, since these emulators do
not emulate MCU peripherals, no peripheral interrupt is fired
when using them to run a firmware, despite that the firmware
may crash or stall for other reasons before it gets ready for
servicing interrupts.
P2IM abstractively models interrupts as a sequence of
timing-based inputs, with each input corresponding to an
enabled interrupt. When such an input comes in, the emulator
generates and dispatches the matching interrupt to the
firmware. The emulator detects what interrupts are enabled
by the firmware during runtime (discussed in §4.3). P2IM
allows both the sequence and the timing of interrupts to
be customized based on different fuzzing strategies (e.g.,
purely random generation, mutation from crafted seeds, etc.).
Our current prototype uses a simple interrupt firing strategy:
enabled interrupts are fired in a round-robin fashion at a
fixed interval (e.g., after every 1,000 basic blocks executed).
The interval is defined using the number of executed basic
blocks, rather than absolute time (e.g., clock ticks). This basic
block-based interval definition supports arbitrary timings to
be specified for emulators to fire interrupts. More importantly,
using basic block counts to measure interrupt intervals allows
for deterministic replay of interrupt sequences, and therefore,
yields reproducible fuzzing/testing results. This reducibility
is required for fuzzing, but usually hard to achieve when
using existing fuzzers with asynchronous interrupts enabled.
We note that defining more advanced interrupt firing
strategies is the job of drop-in fuzzer or fuzzer operators and
is out of the scope for P2IM. Although the current interrupt
firing strategy is simple, it already leads to a very high
firmware code coverage as shown in the evaluation section.
3.3 Infeasible Peripheral Inputs & False
Positives
Under the current abstract model definition, P2IM can trigger
code paths in firmware that are infeasible on real devices.
This is because hardware peripherals may only generate
certain inputs and fire interrupt at certain patterns, whereas
P2IM allows fuzzers to generate random peripheral inputs
or adopt arbitrary interrupt timing. Such infeasible inputs and
code paths may cause false positives during fuzzing (i.e., a
crash/hang is caused by an infeasible input/path, rather than
by a firmware bug). However, as a generic firmware testing
framework, P2IM does not prune potentially infeasible inputs
or code paths. Instead, P2IM leaves the task of input pruning,
which is part of the input generation process, to the testing
tools running on top of P2IM (e.g., a fuzzer). This design
decision is made for two reasons. First, input generation and
input quality control are among the core tasks of fuzzers
and other dynamic testing tools. P2IM is designed to support
these tools and not in the position to interfere with these tasks.
Second, as observed in [50], peripherals such as Wi-Fi radio
are vulnerable to remote attacks (e.g., an attacker sending
malformed network packet), and once compromised, can
generate unexpected input or interrupt timing. Therefore,
testing firmware with unexpected/infeasible peripheral inputs
might be desirable in some cases.
Nevertheless, we did not see in our extensive experiments
any crashes/hangs that were caused by the infeasible inputs
or code paths introduced by P2IM, despite that no input
pruning was performed. All crashes/hangs detected on P2IM
were reproducible on real hardware (i.e., they were caused
by true bugs in tested firmware), except for two false hangs
that were caused by P2IM. We analyze these two cases and
the limitations of P2IM that caused them in §5.3.
4 Automatic Model Instantiation
As illustrated in Figure 3, the second step of P2IM is the
instantiation of an abstract model defined in the first step,
producing a full model for a given firmware. The instantiated
model guides the emulator to identify and handle I/O
operations through the process-peripheral interfaces. During
the instantiation step, the firmware-specific information
needed for providing P2IE is added to an abstract model.
The model instantiation process is fully automatic and
uses the explorative execution technique. The instantiation is
on-demand and interleaved with the firmware fuzzing/testing
process. The fuzzing process invokes the model instantiation
process when it encounters unmodeled or unhandled
peripheral access. The model instantiation process terminates
and the fuzzing resumes when the model becomes stable
and no new information (e.g., newly identified registers) is
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Figure 4: Model instantiation workflow
added to the model for a while. Note that this switch is not
triggered by the model reaching a certain level of precision.
We call each invocation of the model instantiation process
“one round of model instantiation”. Multiple rounds of model
instantiation can happen at different points throughout a
firmware fuzzing/testing process. The model instantiation
process is deterministic and repeatable. An instantiated model
can be reused for the same firmware. The process relies on a
customized QEMU that emulates the Cortex-M instruction set
and a generic interrupt controller but not MCU peripherals.
Specifically, an instantiated model contains the following
automatically inferred firmware-specific information, which
concretizes the abstract model: (1) identified memory-
mapped registers, their memory locations, and types; (2)
the access handling strategies for each type of registers, or
each use site when needed; (3) the enabled interrupts and the
firing strategy. An instantiated model does not contain any
information about peripheral configurations or internals.
Figure 4 shows the high-level workflow of the model in-
stantiation process. It executes the firmware on a generic
processor emulator which does not emulate any peripherals.
It continuously instantiates the model when firmware accesses
the processor-peripheral interfaces. Upon a register access, it
(re-)categorizes the register if necessary as described in §4.1.
Then it handles the register access as described in §4.2. Spe-
cially, for an SR read, it checks whether a handler exists. If not,
it performs the explorative execution to automatically gener-
ate a handler (§4.2). It also monitors interrupt configurations
by the firmware and fires interrupts when needed (§4.3)
4.1 Register Identification
The goal of register identification is to detect the memory-
mapped registers exposed by peripherals and determine
their types according to our category and access pattern
definition (§3.1). It identifies and categorizes all registers
that are accessed by the firmware as it runs on P2IM.
During the model instantiation process, P2IM monitors
firmware’s access to the memory segment reserved for
peripheral registers (e.g., 0x40000000–0x5fffffff on
ARM Cortex-M MCUs [1] [44], as captured in the abstract
model). P2IM considers each accessed memory word in this
segment a memory-mapped register.
Although detecting such registers is straightforward,
determining their types is fairly challenging because P2IM
or the emulator does not have any knowledge about the
semantics of the registers or the peripherals that the registers
belong to. Overcoming this challenge, P2IM determines
the type of a newly identified register based on the per-type
register access patterns that we empirically observed and
generalized from a large set of MCU peripherals (§3.1).
Peripheral Association: In addition to identifying peripheral
registers and their types, P2IM also groups them based on if
they belong to the same peripheral. This grouping is needed
for accurately handling certain SR accesses (discussed in
§4.2). It only considers peripheral association and is unaware
of peripheral types or characteristics. P2IM identifies the
groups based on the spatial adjacency and alignment of
registers’ memory addresses.
4.2 Register Access Handling & Explorative
Execution
P2IM provides strategies for type-based register access
handling, which instructs the emulator, upon register access,
what actions it should take, including return what value to the
firmware or what internal state to update. The strategies for
handling DR and CR accesses are straightforward and uniform
across firmware. They are part of the abstract model defined
in §3.1.
On the other hand, the strategies for handling SR, including
the SR bits in C&SR, are much more complicated. The
strategies may vary across different SR as well as different
use sites of the same SR. For example, the most significant bit
in two different SR, SR1 and SR2, have completely different
meanings. At one point of firmware execution, setting the
bit in SR1 is needed for the firmware execution to continue
without stalling but setting it in SR2 crashes the firmware.
At different points of firmware execution, setting the bit in
SR1 causes the opposite. Therefore, strategies for handling
SR accesses need to consider firmware specifics, individual
registers, and their access contexts. As part of the model
instantiation step, P2IM automatically derives SR handling
strategies using a technique called explorative execution,
which is the focus of this subsection.
The high-level idea of the explorative execution is as
follows. When the firmware execution encounters a new SR
access site, P2IM pauses and snapshots the execution and
starts the explorative execution. By spawning multiple par-
allel worker threads, the explorative execution concurrently
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searches for the best value for the SR, resumes the original
firmware execution, and returns the SR value to the firmware.
The key challenges addressed by our design of this technique
include: constructing a tractable search space of candidate
SR values; determining the scope of the explorative execution
(or the termination condition for the workers); defining
what qualifies the best SR value; reducing the frequency of
explorative executions. We describe our solutions to these
challenges below.
Search Space Construction: The search space could be
intuitively constructed by including all possible values for an
SR. This interprets to 232 candidate values on a 32-bit MCU
and in turn requires the explorative execution to spawn 232
worker threads to test the candidate values, which obviously
is infeasible. Instead, we construct a much smaller and
tractable search space by taking advantage of the fact that
bits/flags in SR are usually independent and only a single flag
is checked at a time. Our search space contains only 32+1
candidate values, each with a single bit set in an SR plus a
zero (all bits clear). The explorative execution spawns one
worker thread to test each candidate value. In each thread,
the candidate value is returned to the firmware as the value of
the SR. All worker threads execute in parallel. P2IM monitors
their progress and picks a winner (i.e., the thread with best
candidate value) at the end of the explorative execution.
Termination of Explorative Workers: When the explorative
execution should terminate a worker thread is another design
question. If too early, the worker thread may have not reached
the use of the SR that is critical to firmware execution. If too
late, the explorative execution becomes too long and can cause
significant delay or even halt the firmware execution (e.g., due
to encountering another SR read whose access handling strat-
egy has not been derived yet). We experimented several termi-
nation conditions and different life spans of work threads. We
found one that works well in practice and keeps the runtime
overhead low. It terminates a worker thread when it is about to
return to the next level callee (i.e., when the current call stack
frame, where the SR read happened, is popped). The rationale
is that firmware usually reads an SR in the same function
where it decides if further I/O operations can be performed
based on the SR value. Therefore, having the explorative ex-
ecution continue beyond function boundaries does not yield
additional benefits for finding the best SR value, despite that
it significantly complicates the thread monitoring mechanism
and slows down P2IM. It is worth noting that many worker
threads exit before they reach the termination point because
the assigned SR values are unacceptable to the firmware.
Qualified Workers and SR Values: After all worker threads
terminate, P2IM determines which threads or candidate SR
values qualify for potentially advancing firmware execution.
It then picks the best among the qualified values to return to
the original firmware execution, which concludes the explo-
rative execution. The qualification criteria are: (1) the thread
did not crash or stall; (2) if all threads crashed or stalled,
choose those caused by other factors than the current SR (i.e.,
the crash/halt site is not dependent on the SR value). Among
the qualified worker threads and the candidate SR values they
represent, P2IM selects the best based on the number of DR
accesses, guarded by the SR, that were observed during thread
execution. When multiple equally good SR values are found,
P2IM randomly picks one as the best value (and records the
choice to make the model instantiation process deterministic
and repeatable). The design of the worker qualification and
selection aligns with the definition of P2IE: input values that
are acceptable to firmware and unlock meaningful operations
are used in place of inputs from real peripherals to achieve
P2IE and sufficient for supporting firmware fuzzing/testing.
Minimizing Explorative Executions via SR Grouping: The
design of the explorative execution discussed so far treats in-
dividual SR accesses independently. If implemented as is, this
design can cause frequent explorative executions (upon every
SR read during firmware execution) and thus high overhead.
But on the other hand, access handling strategies need to be
derived for every use of every SR as explained earlier. We
address these two conflicting needs by optimizing our design
via SR grouping. The idea is that an access handling strategy
derived for one SR at one location, though not universally
applicable to all SR, can be reused for the same SR accessed in
similar locations. Specifically, we group SR accesses based on
their context, defined by a four-tuple (r,cs,bbl,con f ), where
r is the SR; cs is the signature of the call stack at the time
of the SR access; bbl is the ID of the basic block in which
the SR read occurred; con f is the peripheral configuration
hash trivially generated from CR values at the time of the
SR access, which does not contain any semantic information
for peripheral configurations (such as whether the receiver
is on or off). The configuration hash is included because
different CR values cause the firmware to check SR differently.
For example, firmware only checks the data-reception flag
of USART when the receiver is enabled via CR. With SR
grouping, similar SR accesses can reuse the same handling
strategy, which increasingly reduces the frequency of
explorative executions as P2IM instantiates the model.
4.3 Interrupt Identification
Another task that P2IM performs during the model instan-
tiation step is collecting the firmware-specific information
about interrupts. MCU architectures (e.g., Cortex-M) support
hundreds of different interrupts. But a particular device or its
firmware may only use a small subset of supported interrupts.
Moreover, during runtime, firmware sometimes dynamically
disables and re-enables interrupts as needed. If an emulator
fires an unused or disabled interrupt, firmware execution can
stall or crash because firmware commonly uses a simple dead
loop as the default handler for unused interrupts.
P2IM maintains a list of currently enabled interrupts
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during firmware execution. It taps into the virtual interrupt
controller of QEMU (Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller,
NVIC), which the firmware configures to enabled/disable
interrupts. Drawing from the list of enabled interrupts, the
interrupt firing strategy defined as part of the abstract model
(§3.2) decides when to fire what interrupts.
4.4 P2IM Implementation
We implemented our framework using QEMU as the base
processor emulator (without any peripheral emulation
capability). Our implementation includes 2,202 lines of
C code added to QEMU (mostly for dynamic firmware
execution instrumentation), 173 lines of C code for fuzzer
integration, and 1,199 lines of Python code for the explorative
execution part of P2IM. We use AFL as the drop-in fuzzer
in our current prototype, which has no built-in support or
awareness of MCU firmware.
We implemented register categorization, peripheral
identification, type-based register access handling, and SR
read grouping logic inside two QEMU functions, namely
unassigned_mem_read and unassigned_mem_write,
where accesses to memory-mapped peripheral registers
are directed to. For fast prototyping, we implemented the
complex logic of explorative execution using Python. But
the worker threads still run natively on QEMU. The interrupt
identification and firing logic are implemented based on the
QEMU’s virtual interrupt controller (NVIC). The logic mon-
itors firmware’s accesses to NVIC_ISERx and NVIC_ICERx
registers to detect enabled interrupts. It fires interrupts via the
armv7m_nvic_set_pending interface exposed by NVIC.
AFL’s emulation mode (used for fuzzing un-instrumented
binaries) only supports user-mode emulation, which is in-
compatible with firmware emulation [13]. TriforceAFL [40]
builds a bridge for AFL to be connected to the full system em-
ulation mode of QEMU. We used TriforceAFL’s code when
implementing the fuzzer integration part of our framework,
which allows fuzzers to be dropped in without modifications.
During runtime, the fuzzer integration code channels inputs
generated by the fuzzer to firmware execution through DR
accesses. It collects code coverage information via the QEMU
instrumentation and returns the information to the fuzzer.
5 Evaluation & Fuzzing Results
We evaluated our framework from three different angles:
(1) whether it satisfies P2IE when executing firmware for
different MCU with different OSes; (2) how its runtime
performance is in practice; (3) whether it can perform
fuzz-testing on real firmware in a fully emulated fashion (i.e.,
no hardware dependence) and find previously unknown bugs.
To that end, we performed functional unit tests based on
commonly used MCU peripherals and different MCU OSes
(§5.1). We also conducted an end-to-end test on real firmware
(§5.2). Finally, using our framework, we performed fuzzing
on real firmware, found bugs, and gained interesting insights
Table 1: Selected peripherals & functional operations
Peripheral Functional Operations
SPI Receive a byteTransmit a byte
USART Receive a byteTransmit a byte
I2C Read a byte from a slaveWrite a byte to a slave
GPIO
Read status of a pin
Set/Clear a pin
Execute callback after pin interrupt
ADC Read an analog-to-digital conversion
DAC Write a value for digital-to-analog conversion
TIMER Execute callback after interruptRead counter value
PWM Configure PWM as an autonomous peripheral
(§5.4). We conducted all experiments on a moderate-spec
computer with a dual-core Intel® Core™ i5-7260U CPU @
2.20GHz, 8 GB of RAM, and Ubuntu 16.04.
5.1 Unit Tests on MCU Peripherals & OSes
We designed and performed this experiment to verify if our
framework can indeed provide P2IE when fuzzing firmware
that: (1) access a range of peripherals (i.e., P2IM provides
generic peripheral support), (2) are designed for different
MCU SoCs (i.e., P2IM is applicable to a broad class of
MCU), and (3) use different OS/system libraries (i.e., P2IM is
OS agnostic). For this purpose, we collected a set of example
firmware as unit test cases for this experiment.
Experiment Setup: We identified the 8 most popular MCU
peripherals—implemented as on-chip peripherals—by
analyzing the entire MCU product line (1686 MCU parts)
offered by Microchip Technology, a top global MCU vendor.
We selected these peripherals (the left column in Table 1)
for our unit tests. We also selected 3 widely used MCU
OS/system libraries, (NuttX, RIOT, and Arduino) and 3 target
MCU SoCs (STM32 F103RB, NXP MK64FN1M0VLL12,
and Atmel SAM3X8E). We selected these SoCs because they
are part of the reference designs provided by major MCU
vendors, and had been integrated into automotive/marine [3],
consumer [18] and healthcare [12] products.
We collected 70 different example firmware or test cases,
each representing a unique and feasible combination of a
peripheral, an OS, and a SoC. After booting, these firmware
simply perform the basic peripheral operations defined in
Table 1. We made sure these firmware run smoothly on their
target SoC. We then run them using our framework and
collect the statistics and results, including the accuracy of
the instantiated model and end results.
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Table 2: Peripherals and registers accessed during unit tests
Peripherals accessed Registers accessed
Peripheral Max. Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg.
I2C 15 5 9.0 54 18 35.6
ADC 14 6 8.8 68 30 46.0
PWM 14 7 10.2 62 25 43.2
TIMER 14 7 9.7 47 26 38.0
GPIO 13 3 7.7 57 9 34.3
SPI 13 6 8.3 66 19 36.8
USART 13 4 7.5 53 15 30.0
DAC 11 8 9.5 60 35 47.5
Experiment Results: We collected the statistics on periph-
erals and registers accessed during the tests, as shown in
Table 2. This shows that a single peripheral operation often
incurs multiple accesses to related or dependent peripherals
of different kinds. For example, the minimum number of
peripherals accessed for during the GPIO test is 3 and the
maximum number is 15 for I2C. Additionally, multiple regis-
ter accesses are associated with a single peripheral operation.
For instance, the minimum number of involved registers for a
GPIO operation is 9 and the maximum number is 68 for ADC.
These statistics show that even a simple peripheral operation
can involve a complex chain of other peripherals and many
registers, highlighting the value of P2IM and the need for
automatic modeling and handling of MCU peripherals.
We also measured the accuracy of register identification
and categorization. We first manually extracted the ground
truth from the MCU datasheets and then compared the
register categorization output from our system with the
ground truth. Figure 5 c) shows the result aggregated by
peripherals, ranging from 76% to 92% (i.e., 24% to 8%
identified registers are mis-categorized). There are no
particular peripherals on which P2IM performs much better
or worse than others. This suggests that P2IM’s accuracy does
not vary much across different types of peripherals. It also
echos that P2IM is oblivious to peripheral types or internals.
We discuss the reasons of register mis-categorizations and
their impact on firmware execution in §5.3.
The unit test result is that 79% (55) of the tests passed
(i.e., P2IE was satisfied) while 21% (15) failed. For a test
to qualify as pass, the firmware under test needs to properly
boot, configure the peripherals, and conduct the functionality,
without any crash, stall, or operation skipping. The pass
rate of 79% may not seem very high at first glance. But
considering it represents an improvement from 0% (i.e., no
previous work can generically and automatically model MCU
peripheral I/O), we argue the result is in fact significant.
The per-MCU and per-peripheral breakdowns are shown in
Figures 5 a) and b). The former shows that P2IM performs
equally well across different MCU SoC and OS combinations,
suggesting it is MCU- and OS-agnostic. The latter reveals
that P2IM encountered failures on USART, TIMER, I2C, and
GPIO but not the other peripherals.
We found 2 general causes for failed tests. First, register
mis-categorizations can happen when peripheral drivers fail
to follow the correct/common register access patterns. In our
experiments, we observed the majority of failures on GPIO
and I2C peripherals are due to this reason. Second, some
peripherals multiplex individual interrupts, which can cause
P2IM to fire incorrect interrupts.
Overall, this experiment shows that P2IM works reasonably
well on a large set of example firmware (using real drivers
and system libraries and no accommodation to P2IM). It
allows most of the firmware to execute, without any crash,
stall, or operation skipping, on an emulator that does not
support MCU peripherals. Moreover, P2IM is shown to be
agnostic to firmware’s target MCU and OS.
5.2 End-to-end Tests against Real Firmware
This experiment examines the performance of our framework
when running and testing real MCU firmware of different
kinds. These firmware are much bigger and more complex
than the unit test firmware used in the previous experiment,
although the unit tests are larger in quantity and more diverse
in terms of the used peripherals and target MCU and OSes.
This and the previous experiment together show P2IM’s
ability of handling diverse and complex firmware.
Experiment Setup: We selected 10 firmware of real MCU-
based devices used for different purposes, ranging from
drones to industrial control systems. They are full-fledged
firmware and contain all the common firmware components,
including the kernel (e.g., scheduler, interrupt handler, system
libraries), drivers, console, application logic, etc. They
collectively cover 4 MCU models (from 3 top MCU vendors
by revenue [10]), 4 OSes and a diverse set of peripherals
(Table 8). Moreover, the underlying SoC used in these
firmware are often used in other embedded or IoT devices.
We evaluated both the model instantiation mechanism (in the
current section) and the fuzzing performance (§5.4) on the
10 selected firmware. The details about the 10 firmware are
presented in Table 8 in Appendix C. A brief description for
each firmware is as follows:
Self-balancing Robot: This is the motion controller
firmware in a robot architecturally similar to commercial
personal transporters (e.g., Segway PT). Even basic vulnera-
bilities in such firmware, such as integer overflows, can lead
to disastrous consequences [29] or life-threatening accidents.
PLC (Programmable Logic Controller): PLC is a rugged
embedded device for controlling critical processes in in-
dustrial environments (e.g., assembly lines). This selected
firmware is part of a sterilizer machine and manages a PLC’s
communication with remote SCADA (Supervisory control
and data acquisition) systems via Modbus, an industrial com-
munication protocol [11]. Vulnerabilities in PLC firmware
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Figure 5: Unit test results aggregated by MCU SoC/OS (a) and Peripheral (b). Accuracy of register categorization (c)
are often critical as demonstrated by the Stuxnet attack [53].
Gateway: This firmware is for a gateway device that uses
the Firmata [7] protocol to communicate with its host com-
puter, allowing the host computer to access and configure
MCU peripherals dynamically, such as sensors and actuators.
Security vulnerabilities in such firmware can be exploited to
remotely hijack/abuse embedded devices.
Drone: This firmware drives the MCU-based autopilot con-
troller in a quad-copter similar to the Pluto Drone [38]. It
controls multiple sensors, radios, motors, etc. and implements
a suite of control algorithms, such as PID (proportional, inte-
gral and derivative). Vulnerabilities in drone firmware can be
exploited to manipulate drones and cause physical damage.
CNC: This firmware is a Cortex-M port of the widely
used Grbl milling controller [8]. Grbl has been used in many
commercial and open-source 3D printers, laser cutters, hole
drillers, etc. This firmware includes a G-code interpreter, the
linear/circular interpolation algorithms, and the stepper-motor
control routines. Vulnerabilities in the G-code interpreter or
control routines can lead to physical injuries of machine oper-
ators or destruction of the milling equipment.
Reflow Oven: This firmware is for a commercial-grade re-
flow oven [15] controller used for assembly of printed circuit
boards (PCB). This controller implements push-buttons and
LCD as user interface, thermocouple input, acoustic alarm,
and dual output for the heating element and oven fan. The tem-
perature profile of controller is based on the multi-ramp [26]
PID control loop. Vulnerabilities in this firmware can compro-
mise the industrial processes and the quality of PCB assembly.
Console: This firmware implements all the standard utilities
of the RIOT OS and exposes the shell through a serial console.
The shell of RIOT implements a small but powerful interface
to execute user-defined callbacks and other system utilities for
control and diagnostic purposes. Vulnerabilities in the shell
can compromise internal data structures of the OS and even
expose a device to remote code execution.
Steering Control: This firmware implements the algorithm
of a steer-by-wire [22] controller deployed in a lab-grade self-
driving vehicle. It takes commands from the main on-board
computer and translates them to electrical signals to control
servomotors [20]. Bugs in this or similar type of devices
are the causes of multiple documented deadly car accidents,
plaints and recalls from major automotive companies [30].
Soldering Iron: This firmware is an open-source version of
the popular “TS100” soldering Iron. It implements an LCD
and several push buttons for adjusting temperature and other
parameters. Internally, it runs a PID control algorithm and an
acceleration sensing routine for auto-power off. Vulnerabili-
ties in these devices can lead to overheating of the soldering
iron, which can cause damages to the objects being soldered
or injuries to the operators.
Heat Press: This firmware corresponds to an industrial
heat press [9] used in a textile sublimation production line.
The firmware implements recipe manager for controlling the
temperature, time and pressure of the sublimation process.
The system features a touch screen and a remote industrial
I/O channel using the Modbus protocol. Vulnerabilities in this
type of systems can lead to unintended operations, remote
hijacking, and damage of industrial facilities.
Experiment Results: Our framework achieved similar or
even better results on real firmware than on the unit tests.
As shown in Table 3, the register categorization accuracy
(Acc.%) is even higher than measured in the unit tests,
despite that the real firmware are more complex and access
more registers and peripherals. Our manual verification
attributes this better result to the fact that these firmware
follow the register access patterns more strictly than the
sample drivers in the unit tests. We explain the reasons and
impacts of register mis-categorizations in §5.3. The last
column of Table 3 shows the total time (in seconds) spent on
model instantiation for each firmware. The time consumed
(10 minutes in the worse case) is acceptable given that a
typical fuzzing session often lasts for days or longer.
Figure 6 shows the progress of the model instantiation
for each firmware. As explained in §4, P2IM launches a
new round of model instantiation when it encounters an
unmodeled or unhandled peripheral interface access. For most
firmware, P2IM instantiated the models within 3 rounds. Note
that the last few rounds of model instantiation for PLC, Drone,
HeatPress and Soldering Iron formed new SR read groups,
which are not shown in the figure for simplicity. Gateway
incurs 25 rounds model instantiation because it initializes
peripherals on-demand (i.e., additional model instantiation
is needed when a new peripheral is initialized after the model
has stabilized). On the 10 tested firmware, P2IM triggers a
round of model instantiation every 2,579 seconds, on average,
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Table 3: Model instantiation statistics on 10 real firmware
Firmware Peri. Regs. Acc. SR Int. Time
(%) group line (s)
Robot 7 43 100.0 16 1 131.2
PLC 5 21 100.0 5 2 6.8
Gateway 14 101 93.4 14 5 612.4
Drone 11 68 100.0 20 2 315.7
CNC 12 81 91.5 5 2 48.3
Reflow O. 6 32 95.8 1 2 4.4
Console 11 43 88.5 9 1 28.0
Steering C. 11 79 69.6 14 3 96.2
Soldering I. 13 84 90.7 33 9 512.0
Heat Press 4 76 84.0 25 2 59.4
until all peripheral interfaces are modeled.
In most cases, P2IM automatically derived proper models
to support firmware execution with P2IE satisfied (i.e., no
crash, stall, or operation skipping). We will present the two
cases that break P2IE in §5.3. We then used these models to
perform fuzzing on all the firmware (§5.4).
This end-to-end experiment on real firmware and the
unit tests firmware together confirm that our framework
achieves its goal: enabling hardware-independent and
scalable firmware testing/fuzzing via P2IM. Moreover, the
overhead and inaccuracy are low enough for our framework
to be used in practice.
5.3 Register Mis-categorizations & False
Crashes/Hangs
In this section, we discuss the two types of false positives,
namely register mis-categorizations and false crashes/hangs,
that our mechanism may cause.
Register Mis-categorizations: We manually examined
all the registers mis-categorized by P2IM while being tested
against the 10 real firmware. We itemized their potential
impacts on firmware execution and present number of mis-
categorized registers per impact in Table 4. For each impact,
we give a representative example of the mis-categorized
register and explain why the register is mis-categorized.
When calculating the register categorization accuracy,
we only consider registers that have been read at least once
during firmware execution (i.e., registers never read are not
counted because they do not affect the firmware execution).
In Table 4, the last column shows the total number of registers
that have been read by the firmware. The middle two columns
show the number of registers mis-categorized by P2IM for
each firmware. The mis-categorized registers are grouped
in two types based on their negative impact to firmware
fuzzing (i.e., slowing down fuzzing or reducing the coverage).
The overall accuracy of register categorization (the “Acc.”
column in Table 3) for each firmware is calculated as follows:
Accuracy=1−(TypeI+TypeII)/TotalRegistersRead.
Table 4: Numbers of mis-categorized registers on 10 real
firmware, grouped by their impacts: either slowing down
fuzzing (Type I) or limiting coverage (Type II). The last
column shows the total number of registers that have been
read during the firmware fuzzing process.
Firmware Mis-cat. Regs Mis-cat. Regs Total Regs Read
(Type I) (Type II) by Firmware
Robot 0 0 25
PLC 0 0 18
Gateway 4 0 61
Drone 0 0 39
CNC 1 3 47
Reflow O. 0 1 24
Console 0 3 26
Steering C. 6 1 23
Soldering I. 4 1 54
Heat Press 4 0 25
Total # (%) 19 (5.6%) 9 (2.6%) 342 (100%)
Type-I mis-categorizations, mostly SR mis-categorized to
DR, may slow down the fuzzing process but do not stop or
break it. The reason is that this type of mis-categorizations
causes the fuzzer to guess the SR value that is supposed to be
quickly generated by P2IM. Nonetheless, AFL can effectively
guess the proper value using the coverage information as
guidance. Mis-categorized registers of this type are caused by
certain peripheral drivers not following the access patterns we
defined to categorize registers. We analyzed these cases man-
ually and found that these drivers should have followed the
access patterns to avoid potential I/O errors. One exception
is that the firmware writes SR (to clear potential peripheral
errors) before ever reading it (to check the peripheral state),
which causes the SR to be mis-categorized to DR due to the
write-on-first-access pattern for identifying DR.
Type-II mis-categorizations, mostly DR mis-categorized
to CR, prevent the fuzzer from reaching some code paths
that depend on the input from the mis-categorized DR. Such
mis-categorized DR may stall part of the firmware (e.g., one
thread of the Soldering Iron firmware) and partially break
P2IE. This is because P2IM is unable to channel the fuzzer-
generated input into the firmware through the mis-categorized
register. The cause of such register mis-categorizations,
similar to the previous type, is that drivers fail to follow the
common/correct register access patterns to avoid potential
I/O errors. One exception is that some GPIO peripherals
expose multiple pins via one DR. To write data to a pin, a
driver has to follow the RMW pattern to avoid overwriting
other pins, which causes DR to be mis-categorized into CR.
This is a limitation of our register categorization method.
In summary, only 8.2% registers read by firmware were
mis-categorized, and less than one third (2.6% out of 8.2%)
of the mis-categorized registers negatively impacted P2IE.
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Figure 6: Per-round Progression of Model Instantiation (registers and peripherals covered) on 10 Real Firmware
This is empirically acceptable because, as shown in §5.4,
P2IM achieves good fuzzing performance on real firmware
despite the (rare) mis-categorized registers. P2IM enables
hardware-free and scalable MCU firmware testing. It achieves
high code coverage and finds previously unknown bugs, with
no false crashes and very few false hangs.
False Crashes/Hangs: In our evaluation, we found that no
crashes/hangs are caused by infeasible input or code paths
introduced by P2IM (§3.3). This justifies our design decision
that leaves the task of input pruning to the fuzzer. However,
we found two hangs on the Soldering Iron firmware caused
by the limitations of P2IM: one is caused by a DR that is mis-
categorized as CR (discussed above) and the other is due to
firmware’s usage of DMA, which is very difficult to model au-
tomatically and we consider it out of the scope for this paper.
Except for the two hangs, all other crashes/hangs found by
P2IM are caused by real bugs inside the firmware. We verified
this by running the firmware on real devices with the same
inputs that caused crashes/hangs on P2IM, and then confirmed
that these inputs also cause crashes/hangs on the real devices.
5.4 Fuzzing Results & Case Studies
In this section, we demonstrate that P2IM, without requiring
any MCU hardware or peripherals, is able to fuzz-test real
MCU firmware and find previously unknown bugs. In our
experiments, we used the unmodified AFL as the drop-in
fuzzer for P2IM2. We did not use or evaluate other fuzzers
because finding or designing a better fuzzer is not the goal
of this work. P2IM feeds AFL-generated inputs to firmware
execution via DR (identified during the model instantiation
process) when accessed. P2IM collects and sends the
execution coverage to AFL as the fuzzing feedback.
For simplicity, we used randomly generated seed inputs
(i.e., no expert knowledge about firmware input is given to
the fuzzer). For testing purposes, our framework uses a very
2Any existing or future fuzzers can be used as a drop-in component
Table 5: Unique bugs detected in real firmware
Firmware CWE* Unique bugs
PLC
704, 129, 787 3
190, 129, 787 1
681, 129, 400 1
Gateway 129, 787 1
Heat Press 129, 787 1
* Common Weakness Enumeration (www.mitre.org)
basic memory error detector, which is based on the segment
tracking heuristics described in [46]. It enforces the least
permissions needed by each memory segment: R+X for flash,
R+W for RAM, peripherals, and system control block, and
no-access for the rest of the memory. As a result, it can
only detect a small set of bugs (i.e., memory corruptions that
span region boundaries and violate the permissions).
After fuzzing each firmware for 24 hours, our framework
found 7 unique and previously unknown bugs in the firmware
(Table 5). All of them were later confirmed as exploitable by
our manual analysis. Based on the result, we can reasonably
anticipate that our framework is likely to find even more bugs
in these firmware by using expert-crafted seed input and an
advanced MCU memory sanitizer (both are orthogonal to the
topic of this paper). We reported all the bugs to the device
vendors.
As shown in Table 5, the bug found in Gateway is a
combination of an improper validation of array index
(CWE-129) and an out-of-bound write (CWE-787). This
bug allows a remote attacker to overwrite data objects
on the embedded device and cause denial of service or
data corruption. The bug found in Heat Press shares a
very similar nature with the Gateway bug. The five bugs
found in PLC, three similar and two distinct in nature, are
combinations of the common programming errors, such as
incorrect type cast (CWE-704), integer overflow (CWE-190),
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Table 6: Fuzzing performance on 10 real firmware
Firmware Speed Basic block coverage
(run/s) w/o P2IM w/ P2IM Improv.
Robot 29.5 2.5% 43.1% 17.0x
PLC 32.7 3.5% 26.1% 7.6x
Gateway 17.8 1.7% 45.2% 26.5x
Drone 17.2 8.4% 58.4% 6.9x
CNC 18.0 2.7% 69.5% 26.1x
Reflow O. 24.7 3.6% 39.8% 11.2x
Console 14.6 2.2% 37.8% 17.2x
Steering C. 32.3 0.7% 19.8% 29.5x
Soldering I. 13.5 4.2% 53.2% 12.7x
Heat Press 39.4 1.1% 28.1% 24.8x
incorrect conversion between numeric types (CWE-681), and
uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400).
Some of these bugs are more critical than others due to the
possibility of arbitrary memory read/write by remote attackers.
To demonstrate the real security impact, we developed a proof-
of-concept (PoC) for the PLC bugs. As shown in Figure 8,
the PLC device is typically attached to a fieldbus through Se-
rial Port. Any malicious devices on the bus, either owned by
an adversarial insider or compromised by a remote attacker,
can exploit the PLC bugs we found by sending crafted com-
mands over the fieldbus. By the PoC, we modified the internal
memory arrays in PLC which contain the critical parameters
for PID (Proportional, Integral, Derivative control algorithm).
Using this PoC, an attacker can directly influence the PLC-
controlled industrial process, causing Stuxnet-like damages.
This fuzzing experiment not only demonstrates our frame-
work’s ability to find bugs in real firmware but also shows
its relatively high level of code coverage and fuzzing speed.
Table 6 shows the fuzzing speed (number of fuzzing runs per
second), the basic block coverage without P2IM, the basic
block coverage with P2IM, and how much coverage P2IM im-
proves. With P2IM, the code coverage improved 7 to 30 times
from the coverage without P2IM, echoing the value of P2IM
and the importance of (automatic) peripheral I/O handling.
The much-improved code coverage may still seem low
number-wise. We investigated it and found four main causes
for it. First, these firmware tend to contain dead code as reg-
ular software does (i.e., unused or fractionally used libraries).
Second, AFL is a simple grey-box fuzzer that is not good at
breaking through complex path conditions (e.g., checksum
checks). Such inputs and path conditions are commonly seen
in firmware. Since P2IM hosts fuzzer as a drop-in component,
we can replace AFL with a more advanced fuzzer such
as [52] to overcome this problem. Third, the two false hangs
on Soldering Iron firmware causes fuzzer unable to cover part
of the firmware. Fourth, we identified that not only the input
values, but also the input duration (i.e., how long an input
value/signal maintains), affect firmware execution on embed-
ded devices. However, neither P2IM nor any existing fuzzer
considers input duration, which poses an open challenge
for future research. For example, Soldering Iron and Reflow
Oven firmware constantly read from GPIO while performing
different operations determined by the duration of the same
GPIO value/signal. Existing fuzzers generate inputs without
considering input durations. Despite the existence of a func-
tioning timer in P2IM (by which the firmware can measure the
duration of a GPIO value), firmware operations triggered by
long durations of GPIO values can not be executed. The lack
of support for varying input duration, although can be partly
mitigated by P2IM, needs to be better addressed by fuzzers,
which are the dedicated component for input generation. We
believe that input duration is a unique challenge for MCU
firmware fuzzing, which is out of the scope of this paper and
is an interesting topic to study for future works.
We also identified two reasons as to why we could not
detect even more bugs than the 7 reported in Table 5. First,
some firmware designs are not susceptible to memory
corruption errors. For example, the Reflow Oven and Steering
Control firmware rarely use buffers or dynamically allocated
memory for performance reasons. Therefore, such firmware
is unlikely to have memory corruption bugs. Second, the bare
minimum memory error detector (or sanitizer) that we im-
plemented may fail to catch the bugs triggered by the fuzzer.
For example, we manually identified 1 extra bug on the PLC
firmware. The bug, although similar to those found during
fuzzing (Table 5), was triggered by P2IM during testing but
went undetected by the simple memory error detector.
6 Discussion
Direct Memory Access (DMA): P2IM models the processor-
peripheral interfaces, including registers and interrupts. It
does not model Direct Memory Access (DMA), which allows
peripherals to directly access RAM and in turn provide input
to firmware. The lack of DMA support is a limitation of our
work. Due to DMA’s complex and peripheral-specific nature,
modeling DMA is arguably impossible without considering
internal peripheral designs, which goes against P2IM’s design
principle—being generally applicable to a wide range of
peripherals and MCU devices. Nonetheless, the usage of
DMA depends on the design and architecture of individual
firmware. We observed that most of the MCUs studied and
tested support DMA. However, only 1 out of the 10 real
firmware tested in §5.2 actually uses DMA.
Architectures beyond ARM: We analyzed 3 MCUs that use
non-ARM architectures for IoT devices: ATmega328P (AVR),
PIC32MX440F256H (MIPS) and FE310-G000 (RISC-V).
Our analysis shows that our design of P2IM and the abstract
model that we defined are not specific to the ARM architec-
ture. They can be extended to support the other architectures
such as AVR, MIPS and RISC-V. All these non-ARM archi-
tectures define specific memory-mapped areas for peripherals
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similar to ARM. They also follow similar register categories
(CR, SR, DR and C&SR) that P2IM identifies. Furthermore, the
procedures to configure and operate peripherals on these non-
ARM architectures follow the same conventions and patterns
that P2IM uses for recognizing and handling peripheral I/O.
We observed a slight difference in accessing memory-
mapped I/O by AVR. AVR can use either specific opcodes
(IN/OUT) or ST/LD instructions to access mapped peripheral
registers. ST and LD instructions require a constant offset to
access the same addresses accessed by IN/OUT opcodes. We
also observed that RISC-V implements a unique interrupt han-
dling mechanism that uses Hardware Threads (HART) and
a Platform-Level Interrupt Controller (PLIC). RISC-V also
uses a new type of hybrid register (S&DR) that is not seen on
the other architectures. P2IM and the current abstract model
can be extended to handle these architectural differences and
in turn support these non-ARM MCU architectures.
Firmware Analysis beyond Fuzzing: Although our work
was initially inspired by the open challenges facing firmware
fuzzing, it is not designed to support fuzzing exclusively.
Other types of dynamic firmware analysis that do not require
fully accurate output from firmware can use our framework
to achieve hardware-independence and scalability. For
instance, data or code reachability analysis, such as taint
analysis and certain debugging tasks, can benefit from our
framework. In particular, concolic firmware execution can
use our framework to generate more realistic concrete inputs
(i.e., non-crashing/stalling), reduce the number of symbolic
values, and avoid some infeasible code paths.
7 Related Work
Dynamic Firmware Analysis: Several recent works ad-
dressed the high barrier of dynamically analyzing MCU
firmware. They follow the hybrid emulation approach,
which forwards peripheral operations to real devices while
running firmware on a customized emulator. Avatar [54]
proposed a novel framework for hybrid emulation and used
it for conducting concolic execution [33]. Surrogates [43]
significantly improves the forwarding performance of Avatar
via customized hardware. A follow-up work [46] fuzz-tested
simple programs with manually injected vulnerabilities using
Avatar and revealed that, without an effective sanitizer for
MCU, fuzzers by themselves cannot observe many bugs even
if they are triggered. Avatar2 [45] extends Avatar to allow
replay of forwarded peripheral I/O without using real devices.
Charm [51] targets smartphone drivers, rather than MCU
firmware. It adopts the forwarding approach similar to Avatar.
Prospect [42] forwards peripheral accesses at the syscall
level, which however does not exist on bare-metal MCU
devices. [41] uses cached peripheral accesses to approximate
firmware states for analysis.
These works collectively improved the state of the art of
dynamic firmware analysis. However, they have heavy hard-
ware dependence, which is at odds with speedy and scalable
fuzzing. Plus, they require significant expert-knowledge and
human efforts to set up and run. In contrast, our framework
is largely automated and completely removes hardware
dependency from dynamic firmware analysis, without using
peripheral I/O forwarding or replaying. Moreover, we found
bugs from real MCU firmware whereas none of the previous
works did, echoing the value of the scalable fuzzing enabled
by our framework.
Another line of works analyzed firmware running in fully
emulated environments [32, 36, 48] or directly on the target
hardware [50]. Instead of MCU devices, these works target
Linux-based devices, which are closer to general-purpose
computers than truly embedded devices. Linux-based devices
have much better emulator support due to the much less
diverse peripherals than MCU devices. Analyzing firmware
of these devices does not face the MCU-specific challenges
that our work overcame.
Static Firmware Analysis: FIE [37] applied symbolic
execution to TI MSP430 firmware by extending KLEE [31]
with a peripheral model. It returns an unconstrained symbolic
value for each peripheral register read. It assumes any
enabled interrupts can happen after every instruction, which
caused the state explosion problem. Inception [34] address
this problem by optionally forwarding peripheral access
to hardware using Avatar [54]. FirmUSB [39] proposed a
symbolic execution mechanism tailored for USB controller
firmware on 8051/52 architectures using domain specific
knowledge. Firmalice [49] aims to find authentication
bypass vulnerabilities in firmware via concolic execution.
A large-scale study on Linux-based firmware [35] reported
presence of weak passwords and known-vulnerable code.
Although addressing the same high-level problem of firmware
security, these works follow an orthogonal approach from
ours (static vs. dynamic analysis).
8 Conclusion
We presented P2IM, a novel technique for modeling the I/O
behaviors of the processor-peripheral interfaces. It is the first
to enable peripheral-oblivious emulation of MCU devices,
and in turn, allow MCU firmware to be dynamically tested
with high code coverage, at scale, and without hardware
dependence. We built P2IM into a framework that executes
a given firmware binary and hosts a drop-in fuzzer (AFL)
as the input source. We evaluated the framework using
70 sample firmware and 10 real device firmware. It fully
booted and tested 79% of the firmware without any human
intervention. When paired with a limited memory error
detector, it found 7 new bugs from the real device firmware.
The results suggest that our framework is of great value and
potential for practical use.
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(a) Front panel (b) PLC control panel
Figure 7: Sterilizer used in an industrial food processing facil-
ity, whose firmware was among the 10 real firmware we tested
A Vulnerability Analysis and PoC: PLC
firmware
We confirmed all 7 bugs found on PLC, Gateway and Heat
Press firmware (Table 5) are exploitable by Proof of Concepts
(PoC). For simplicity, we present PoC for one bug found on
PLC firmware.
The PLC firmware tested was obtained from a sterilizer
machine in an industrial food facility (figure 7). This firmware
contains the standard OS functionality of Arduino, the user/-
control logic (PID loops, schedule), and the communication
stack. The communication stack implements the Modbus
RTU slave protocol. This protocol uses USART peripheral
over the RS485 standard to access the fieldbus. The PLC
receives Modbus queries from a human-machine interface
(HMI) or SCADA, which is also connected to the fieldbus.
The OS and the communication stack are based on the
Arduino framework with some modifications made by the
equipment vendor. We obtained the source code of the com-
munication stack (Modbus) from the public repository of the
hardware vendor. We ported this AVR source code to Cortex-
M without any manual changes thanks to Arduino compatibil-
ity. This is the firmware that we used on our fuzzing session.
Our analysis determined that the crashes triggered during
the fuzzing session result from a buffer overflow bug in the
Modbus implementation. The root cause of this bug is a
wrong casting in the validation of Function Code 15 (FC15)
of the Modbus protocol. This function code is used to force
multiple coils (write multiple memory locations). The field
that controls the number of coils can be crafted to bypass the
validation of FC15. This bug allows attackers to overwrite
device memory.
The Vulnerability that we discovered can be used to
launch Stuxnet-like attacks remotely. The reason is that FC15
Attacker's 
Laptop
Gateway PLC
USB-to-RS485
adapter
SCADA
fieldbus (Modbus RS-485)
Figure 8: Scenario of a remote attack on Modbus over RS485
Figure 9: PID data structure before and after attack; It is
overwritten to 0xdead 0xbeef.
provides attacker two primitives to control where and what to
write on PLC memory. We verified that, although the memory
span controlled by the attacker is limited, it is still possible
to overwrite important PLC data structures. We implemented
a POC to demonstrate this capability.
To run the POC, we used the NUCLEO144-F429ZI devel-
opment board to play the role of a PLC running the vulnerable
firmware. We connected the USART of our PLC to our laptop
(i.e., attacker) trough a USB-to-Serial adapter. We modified
an open-source version of the Master Modbus library to craft
a FC15 Modbus master query, which runs in the attacker lap-
top. In addition, we connected a computer to the debugging
port of the PLC to check the result of our attack. This setup
implements the attack scenario presented in figure 8.
Figure 9 shows the output of the debugging console of the
PLC and confirms the success of the POC (i.e., memory being
overwritten with an attacker-supplied value). It demonstrates
that our framework was able to identify bugs with security
consequences on real production firmware. Consequently,
P2IM is able to model the peripheral-processor interface
of USART and automatically channel data from the fuzzer
engine to test upper layers (Modbus) of real firmware.
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B Full Results of Unit Tests
Table 7 shows the full results for all the 70 unit tests (§5.1). We
wrote “N/A” for the 14 tests where the combinations of MCU
Soc and OS/libraries are impossible due to incompatibility.
C Firmware Information
In this section, we extend the information for the real
firmware tested in the end-to-end test (§5.2) and fuzzing
(§5.4). Table 8 presents, for each firmware, its target MCU,
OS, Lines of Code (LoC), size, source, and picture of product.
The reported size of firmware corresponds to the compiled
ELF file, which may contain extra information such as
headers, sections and debug symbols.
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Table 8: Real Firmware Tested
Firmware MCU OS/Sys lib. LoC/size Source/Product Product Image
Robot STM32F103RB Bare metal 32,999/960KB [19] / DIY
PLC STM32F429ZI Arduino 10,578/774KB [5]* / [6]
Gateway STM32F103RB Arduino 12,655/917KB [7] / DIY DIY
Drone STM32F103RB Bare metal 11,163/425KB [14] / [38]
CNC STM32F429ZI Bare metal 7,561/287KB [4] / [2]
Reflow
Oven STM32F103RB Arduino 12,272/820KB [16] / [25]
Console MK64FN1M0VLL12 RIOT 6,984/1,132KB [17] / DIY DIY
Steering
Control SAM3X8E Arduino 4,749/276KB [23] / DIY
DIY
Soldering
Iron STM32F103RB FreeRTOS 43,928/491KB [21] / [18]
Heat Press SAM3X8E Arduino 4,150/248KB [5]*/ Proprietary
*Only open-source libraries are disclosed, PLC/Machine control routines are property of their respective owners.
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